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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Calvillo appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction for one count of
sexual abuse of a child and six counts of lewd conduct with a minor. In his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Calvillo argued two prospective jurors’ prejudicial statements during voir dire, which tainted
the entire jury panel, violated his constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. He
asserted the district court should have granted his motion for a mistrial due to the biased jury. In
addition, Mr. Calvillo respectfully requested this Court clarify the standard of review for the
denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a biased jury. This Reply Brief responds to the State’s
argument on the standard of review issue only.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The  statement  of  the  facts  and  course  of  proceedings  were  articulated  in  Mr.  Calvillo’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–4.) They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated here by reference.
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ISSUE
Was Mr. Calvillo’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury violated due to the district court’s
denial of his motion for a mistrial after two prospective jurors told the entire jury panel that
Mr. Calvillo was incarcerated and went missing?
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ARGUMENT
Mr. Calvillo’s Right To A Fair Trial By An Impartial Jury Was Violated Due To The District
Court’s Denial Of His Motion For A Mistrial After Two Prospective Jurors Told The Entire Jury
Panel That Mr. Calvillo Was Incarcerated And Went Missing
A. The Standard Of Review For The Denial Of A Motion For A Mistrial Is Not Well-Settled
After State v. Perry
In  its  Respondent’s  Brief,  the  State  contends  the  standard  of  review for  the  denial  of  a
motion for a mistrial is well-settled. (Respt. Br., pp.7–8.) Mr. Calvillo respectfully disagrees. The
cases cited by the State for this well-settled standard of review are pre-Perry cases. (Respt.
Br., p.8 (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007); State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908,
912 (2003); State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30,
34 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 94–95 (Ct. App. 1983); State v. Rodriquez,
106 Idaho 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1983)). Perry, however, completely changed the landscape for
appellate standards of review. 150 Idaho 209, 219–28 (2010). As outlined in Perry, preserved
errors are reviewed under the harmless error standard. Id. at 227. There are only two exceptions
to this standard, one of which is relevant here:
Where the error in question is a constitutional violation found to constitute a
structural defect, affecting the base structure of the trial to the point that a
criminal trial cannot serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence, the appellate court shall automatically vacate and remand.
Id. at 227–28 (the second exception applies to erroneous jury instructions). Thus, under Perry,
the standard of review for a preserved error cannot be both potentially harmless and potentially
structural. It is an either-or situation.
Moreover, the Court’s post-Perry opinion in State v. Ellington did not clarify the tension
within the motion for a mistrial standard of review. Although Ellington stated this conflated
standard of review was “well-settled,” it quoted a pre-Perry case for this proposition. 151 Idaho
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53, 68 (2011) (quoting Field, 144 Idaho at 571 (2007), for the standard of review). Later on, the
Court in Ellington declined “to evaluate whether that error was harmless or reversible.” Id. at 70.
And rightfully so. The Court had no reason to decide a non-dispositive issue. Since the Court had
already determined no error had occurred, it would be a waste of time and resources for the
Court, in dicta, to consider whether the error would be harmless or reversible. This act of judicial
restraint does not mean Ellington reaffirmed a pre-Perry standard of review for denial of a
motion for a mistrial. It simply means the Court did not have to decide the issue.
If the jury is biased, that affects the very framework of the trial itself. The deprivation of
the  right  to  fair,  impartial  jury  cannot  be  treated  as  a  harmless  error.  Mr.  Calvillo  recognizes,
however, that not all prejudicial statements will automatically result in a biased jury. For
example, if a prospective juror states he or she believes police officers are not credible witnesses,
this is a prejudicial statement, but it likely does not bias the entire jury. The prospective juror has
put forth a personal opinion that probably would not impact others. On the other hand, if a
prospective juror states he or she knows the defendant was previously convicted of the same
crime or was convicted of a similar crime in the past, this prejudicial statement taints the entire
jury panel. See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 483 (2017) (noting, without deciding, “Many
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have held that the fact that a juror
knew that the defendant has been found guilty or convicted by a previous jury for the same crime
creates an implied bias and constitutes fundamental error because it is inherently prejudicial.”).
The prospective juror has informed the entire panel of a specific fact weighing towards the
defendant’s propensity to commit crimes and his likelihood of guilt. This kind of tangible
information biases the jury against the defendant. In such sitautions, the district court should
declare a mistrial to guarantee an impartial jury. Thus, contrary to the State’s concerns, a
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structural error standard of review will not open the floodgates to the trial courts declaring
mistrials for every potentially prejudicial statement in order to hedge their bets against automatic
reversal on appeal. But mistrials should be granted if the prejudicial statement biases the entire
jury. And while due process guarantees fair, not perfect, trials, “a fundamental value
determination of our society that it  is  far worse to convict  an innocent man than to let  a guilty
man go free.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Allowing a trial
to  continue  with  a  biased  jury  based  on  the  possibility  that,  after  the  defendant  has  been
convicted, a particular prejudicial statement may not have had a continuing impact on the trial all
but guarantees such miscarriages of justice. The declaration of a mistrial after the entire jury
panel is tainted by a prejudicial statement does not give the defendant a perfect trial. It gives him
a fair  one.  Mr.  Calvillo  respectfully  request  this  Court  clarify  the  standard  of  review and  hold
that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for a mistral due to a biased jury is
structural error.
B. The Two Prospective Jurors’ Statements That Mr. Calvillo “Was Incarcerated” And
“Went Missing” Tainted The Entire Jury Panel, Thus Violating Mr. Calvillo’s Right To
A Fair Trial
For all other issues, Mr. Calvillo respectfully refers this Court to his opening Appellant’s
Brief. (App. Br., pp.10–16.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Calvillo respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2017.
___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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